Abstract
Both malware and anti-virus detection tools advance in their capabilities-malware's aim is to evade the detection while anti-virus is to detect the malware. Over time, the detection techniques evolved from simple static signature matching over anti-heuristic analysis to machine learning assisted algorithms. This thesis describes several layers of antivirus evasion deployed by the malware and conducts the analysis of the evasion success rate.
The scientific contribution of this research is in the following techniques the malware usedthe new algorithm for identifying the Windows operating system functions, a new custom developed obfuscation and de-obfuscation routine and the usage of USB and sound devices enumeration in the anti-heuristic detection. The new PE mutation engine facilitates the malware's static signature variation. In the next stage of the assessment, anti-virus engines then test the malware's evasion capabilities. The locally installed antivirus applications and the two multi-scanner online engines inspect the submitted malware samples. The thesis examines the results and discusses the strengths and weaknesses of each evasion technique.
Introduction
For the contemporary malware to be successful, it needs to be capable of bypassing multiple levels of anti-virus detection. This thesis will describe how the malware addresses each of those levels to achieve the evasion. The first level of antivirus protection is static signature detection.
Static signature
This technique searches the file content saved on the disk for a pre-defined sequence of hexadecimal values. The signature is usually up to 64 bytes long. It is also a sequence of bytes specific to the malware that distinguishes that malware from the harmless programs [1] .
There is another type of signature which calculates the hash of the entire file. This signature is using MD5, SHA-1 or similar hashing function to calculate the control sum of the file.
Techniques that complement signature-based scan include the analysis of the API (Application Programming Interface) functions that the software imports or exports. Malware use some APIs frequently to evade the detection. These examples include checking a debugger (IsDebuggerPresent Windows API), injecting the thread into a remote process (CreateRemoteThread Windows API), waiting some time (Sleep Windows API), etc. PE (Portable Executable) header analysis is also a part of the static analysis that looks into the enumeration of the code sections (.text, .data, .rsrc, etc.) and seeks for non-standard names of sections. The study [2] goes into the details of how manipulating the metadata in the PE header can trick some anti-malware engines. In particular, it shows how changing the bytes that determine the file type can make anti-malware use a wrong set of tests to test the file. Another study [3] shows various evasion rates achieved by using the various payloads generated by Metasploit/msfvenom [4] and Veil [5] . The author of the [3] study changed the destination port of the reverse shell connection and used various encoding techniques to obfuscate the payload. The main disadvantage of the approach in [3] is using the off-the-shelf products (Metasploit and Veil). These products are well known to the anti-malware industry which monitors them and develops algorithms to detect malware generated by them. There are some freely available and powerful tools that facilitate a PE file obfuscation such as peCloak.py [6] . The experiment [7] uses a combination of msfvenom and Veil-Evasion anti-virus framework to construct the payload able to bypass antivirus control. A significant advantage of using these tools is that they can change an existing executable file into the obfuscated executable. Such an obfuscated executable is more likely to bypass antivirus detection. The main disadvantage of those tools is that they are off-the-shelf products known to anti-virus vendors.
Heuristics
Malware authors faced a challenge to devise a mechanism capable of evading static analysis, in particular, signature recognition. The idea was to develop a code that will frequently change its signature with each new execution. That lead to the development of techniques such as code obfuscation, polymorphism, metamorphism, using packers/compression. The anti-malware industry has taken countermeasures too. One enhancement was the introduction of a semantic-aware analysis as proposed by the [8] . This semantic-aware inspection can detect simple code manipulations such as inserting NOP sleds, renaming the processor registers, substitution instructions like "inc eax" instead of "add eax,1", instruction reordering-all common obfuscation techniques. However, the weakness is a limited set of obfuscation tricks the tool can identify. For example, the tool cannot detect the substitution of multiplication with the left bit-wise shift. So, "x=x*2" will not be recognised in "x=x<<1". [9] and [10] provide an important insight into the technique that many malware use. The interesting is identifying and loading the APIs based on their calculated hash rather than using the standard LoadLibrary/GetProcAddress. The hashing mechanism is a stealthy technique that hides the names of specific API functions. This technique also facilitates the obfuscation of the code once it loads into the OllyDbg or Ida Pro debuggers. Neither of these debuggers will resolve the API symbolic names, and neither will show the APIs called in the IAT (Import Address Table) table.
The study [11] shows that the checking of the emulator environment attributes, API inconsistencies, timing discrepancies and differences in how CPU instructions execute in the emulator, may infer certain knowledge about specific antivirus. The study also implemented a novel approach that exploited the leak of anti-virus data to disclose anti-virus internal details.
Practical demonstration of coding snippets in [12] does not fingerprint antivirus. It rather attacks with a set of pre-defined windows APIs that are likely not implemented in the emulator or that would return the result that is illogical compared to the result in the execution environment outside emulator. For example, opening the non-existing URL would return "true", multiprocessor functions would return an error, local file creation would fail, etc. The idea behind this work is to pinpoint the gaps between implementing APIs of a fully operational operating system and the sandbox emulator and exploit these gaps to evade the detection. Another paper [13] adds some of its own techniques. These are the simulation of user interaction with keyboard and mouse. The technique that inspects the environment in which the malware executes inspired this thesis. The study [14] shows real malware code snippets used to detect a virtual machine/sandbox. Some specific details explain that various attributes found on the system devices, registry keys or WMI command output can fingerprint the exact VM/sandbox. This approach is very similar to the [15] which provides short code snippets used to detect a particular sandbox or virtual machine.
[11], [13] , [14] , [15] and [12] all share the common weakness-they run a limited number of tests which AV may already recognise. The software assessed in the papers above do not modify the payload once the payload decrypts itself in the memory -they all use the existing set of malware. Another study [16] uses techniques that obfuscate the shellcode, antiheuristics techniques such as opening the file on the local filesystem, mathematical functions to increase the total execution time, certain Windows APIs, etc. One interesting finding was that 64-bit payloads seemed to have low detection rate. Even though the study [16] confirms the findings of other similar studies mentioned before, it also shares their common weaknessa limited number of evasion tricks and the malicious code crafted by the off-the-shelf products.
Even though the heuristic analysis has its own advantages over the static analysis, it also has its disadvantages. The sandbox emulators are the imperfect simulations of the operating system. The sandbox emulators do not deploy a number of features of a regular operating system. Malicious coders focus their effort to detect those discrepancies and detect when their code is operating in the emulator. Another challenge of heuristic analysis is the legitimate software that can demonstrate a suspicious behaviour. The emulators' detection rules which are too stringent cause the false positives. Some other emulators generate false negatives due to their too flexible rules.
Machine learning
The latest trend in the industry and academic research is a machine-assisted analysis in the malware recognition. The study [17] proposes a framework that uses both automatic classification and clustering algorithms to recognise the novel classes of malware. The study uses similarities in the behaviour specific to malware. The main weakness of this approach is the assumption that the CWSandbox can detect the malware execution. There are techniques available to circumvent the sandbox environment that modern malware deploys. Other studies [18] , [19] similar to [17] aim to decrease the false positives by using the Anubis and Cuckoo sandboxes. The research paper [20] discusses the static attributes of Windows PE file formats. The paper analyses the evasion of a machine learning based on a simple feedback from the detection-successful or unsuccessful. The study targeted only PE attributes. Therefore, the conclusion on the success rate applies only to the static PE header attributes.
Machine learning, in particular, the DTW (Dynamic Type Warping) algorithm was used in [32] to detect system call injection attacks. System call injection is a technique that some malware use to confuse the anti-malware by injecting irrelevant system calls. The main contribution shows it is possible to distinguish between the malware of the same family that deploys the evasion tricks from those that do not. The main weakness of the work is that it observes only two anti-detection features of the malware. Modern malware deploys a multitude of anti-detection/anti-debugging techniques.
Research objectives
The main aim of the research was to construct the malware capable of evading each of the anti-virus protection layers. The protection layers are static signature detection and heuristic detection. The malware sample is a reverse TCP shell. This reverse shell is a piece of code that establishes a connection to the attacker's control server and downloads the payload for a privilege escalation. The secondary aim of the research was coding the mutation engine that changes the malware PE (Portable Executable) attributes. The third aim was to profile the behaviour of anti-virus engines by observing what malware samples it did and which ones it missed to detect.
Design and Implementation
The design of this malware evolves around outbound TCP connection that uses destination TCP port 443 to mimic encrypted web traffic. The traffic used by this reverse shell would not be web traffic. The traffic would be a control connection used to download second stage payload that would allow escalation of privileges for the attacker. Implementing the solution comprises five main phases of the code development. Each of these phases aims to evade a specific set of techniques that antivirus uses to detect the malware. Figure one shows a high-level implementation approach of a code development throughout five phases.
The figure outlines the tools and methodologies utilised in each phase, too. Figure 6 illustrates the phase three high-level approach. 
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Phase 4
Phase 4 deployed the techniques to bypass the heuristic part of the AV engines.
Heuristic detection has become a complex issue. The heuristic detection is not deterministic in terms of its capability to achieve 100% predictable output using the same set of rules.
There does not exist a malware capable of avoiding every heuristic detection algorithm nor the anti-malware capable of detecting all the malware. Besides the anti-heuristic detection techniques in the pseudo-code in Figure 11 , this thesis adds two new detection techniques. To the best knowledge of this thesis author, no other evasion study used these two techniques to detect the sandboxed environment. One of these new techniques uses a detection of the audio drivers installed on the victim machine. It also checks if there is any other audio driver installed, besides the default Windows Primary Sound Driver. If it exists, the detection concludes there is no sandbox environment. The other check verifies present USB connected devices. If the number of the USB devices connected is equal or greater than one, it concludes there is no sandbox environment. A pseudo-code in Figure 11 shows the full list of anti-heuristic techniques used.
Using detection of existing audio devices
This technique assumes that antivirus sandboxes will not implement audio devices enumeration APIs. If sandboxes implemented these APIs, however, they would not find any audio device except a Windows default one labelled Primary Sound Driver. The reason for this assumption is that audio APIs are not relevant to the execution of malware. Therefore, the sandboxes might omit them from the implementation. The technique deployed uses DirectSoundEnumerate Windows API which calls the Windows Callback [21, 22] function.
This callback returns the attributes such as the device description and its associated driver name. Figure 7 below shows an output of the auxiliary code developed to test the audio device enumeration process. This output is from a typical installation of a non-virtual Windows 7 Desktop. If the check finds any other audio driver except Primary Sound Driver, the audio check routine will conclude this is a typical user Windows Desktop installation. The audio check will allow the main code to proceed with further anti-heuristic checks.
Using detection of existing USB devices
Another approach that other evasion studies did not use is enumerating present USB devices [23, 24, 25] . The idea behind this check is like audio drivers. The main assumption is that the sandbox emulator will not have USB device enumeration APIs implemented. In case it implemented them, they would return a single or no entry.
The USB checking routine in the main code enumerates all present USB devices. If a total number of mapped devices is greater than one, it concludes this is a typical Windows Desktop installation and allows the execution of further anti-heuristic checks.
Phase 5
The research [26, 27] that showed an effective anti-virus evasion by using basic modifications of the static PE header attributes inspired the phase 5. To achieve that evasion, this thesis developed a small auxiliary code that takes as an input a
Windows PE file and mutates its PE attributes. These attributes are Date Stamp, Major and Minor Linker Version and names of the PE sections. These values randomly change by each subsequent execution. These PE attributes do not impact the normal execution of the PE file. The mutation engine will change the static signature of the input file. If the same PE file is input again, it will change its static signature again. Figure 9 below shows the high-level mechanism of a PE header manipulation process. A new auxiliary utility named fileattrib2.exe facilitates changing the PE attributes of any file given as its input. Figure 10 above shows the randomisation of section names.
The design of the mutation engine generates randomised bytes from a pre-defined range of values. It copies those randomised bytes into the file's memory mapped structure by CopyMemory API. Then it uses the UnmapViewOfFile API to write the changed attributes to disk. The Figure 11 below shows the pseudo-code of the execution that involves all the techniques described above.
having locally installed antivirus applications was to correlate the evasion ratio with the online antivirus engines.
Results and Analysis
The set of samples consisted of 18 different stages of the code development phases described in the A9.exe Plain shellcode generated by msfvenom, no obfuscation of any kind, no shellcode changes but with simple anti-heuristic behaviour (stealthy check of debugger presence).
A10.exe
Plain shellcode generated by msfvenom, no obfuscation of any kind, no shellcode changes but with simple anti-heuristic behaviour (time delay realised via nested forloop).
A11.exe Plain shellcode generated by msfvenom, no obfuscation of any kind, no shellcode changes but with simple anti-heuristic behaviour (creates child process via checking of the running mutex).
A12.exe Plain shellcode generated by msfvenom, no obfuscation of any kind, no shellcode changes but with simple anti-heuristic behaviour (check whether the memory allocation of 1GB is successful).
A13.exe
Plain shellcode generated by msfvenom, no obfuscation of any kind, no shellcode changes but with simple anti-heuristic behaviour (enumeration of sound devices).
A14.exe Plain shellcode generated by msfvenom, no obfuscation of any kind, no shellcode changes but with simple anti-heuristic behaviour (enumeration of USB devices).
A15.exe Plain shellcode generated by msfvenom, no obfuscation of any kind, no shellcode changes but modified with custom-coded PE metadata mutation engine.
A16.exe Shellcode modified on the assembler level -junk code, changed API hashing algorithm, command equivalency, NOP sleds modified with custom-coded PE metadata mutation engine.
A17.exe Shellcode modified on the assembler level (junk code, changed API hashing algorithm, command equivalency, NOP sleds) with custom-coded obfuscator and modified with custom coded PE metadata mutation engine.
A18.exe Shellcode modified on the assembler level (junk code, changed API hashing algorithm, command equivalency, NOP sleds) with custom-coded obfuscator, full anti-heuristic behaviour and modified with custom-coded PE metadata mutation engine. c) Some samples that were initially thought to be more successful in evasion compared to the pure unmodified shell proved to be less successful than the plain code. For example, the antivirus detected an a15.exe (a PE mutated plain shell) at a higher ratio than the pure shell generated by msfvenom, a1.exe. Another example is where the anti-heuristic methods showed less relevance in the evasion ratio than the modification of the core assembler code (for example, compare a lower evasion ratio of the samples a9.exe-a14.exe against the higher evasion rate of a2.exe and a4.exe). 
Conclusion
One of the achieved objectives of the thesis is a code with high evasion rate. The modification of the code on the assembler level seems to be the most powerful evasion technique. Anti-heuristic techniques increase the evasion too but not as much. USB and audio enumeration achieve the equal evasion effectiveness as any other anti-heuristic method. The code obfuscation sometimes increased and in some decreased the evasion. It is not clear from the evaluation what is causing that behaviour. Even though the academic research published some sophisticated methods for malware detection, the commercial anti-virus engines seem to be behind their implementation.
Many commercial anti-viruses still deploy the ineffective approach based on the static analysis and limited heuristics. The thesis also shows that multiple anti-virus engines show a low rate of false positives against harmlessly modified programs. That result indicates the advancement that happens in the anti-virus industry.
